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is theoretically distinct from and preliminary to them all. The fundamental social science is sociology.

As the reader will have discovered, my own notions of utility and its relations to social phenomena have been made more definite by Dr. Patten's criticism. I am grateful to him for it.

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THE ORGANIC CONCEPT OF SOCIETY.

In a recent book * Professor Small discusses and defends the organic concept of society and quotes certain passages from a paper † of mine to show how this concept has been misunderstood. I, in turn, might properly complain that my meaning has been misconstrued. There is, however, nothing to be gained in joining an issue on so technical a point. If Professor Small's book had appeared in advance of my paper, I would have gladly referred to it for a statement of the doctrines to which I take exception. His book strengthens rather than weakens my opposition to the use of biologic analogies in the discussion of social questions. A clear and definite statement of a false position often exposes its weakness.

The organic concept of society finds its chief strength and support in the phenomena of co-operation. On every side we see some form of division of labor; families unite for common ends, industries are co-ordinated on a large scale, villages, cities and even nations become organized parts of a larger whole, and in this way is built up the vast complexus that is commonly called the industrial organism. Accepting this industrial organism as a fact, it is necessary to inquire into its cause. Is it a part of the nature of things, the outcome of purely social forces or is it due to the objective conditions which surround society? Evidently the latter. Certain peculiarities of soil and climate give certain localities the advantage in particular forms of production, certain deposits of iron, coal and other minerals give an advantage to other localities in these industries and certain other peculiarities of matter and of the crust of the earth give a great advantage to serial production—to round-about methods—as opposed to direct production.

The complex economic world is the outcome of the influence of these objective conditions upon the choices of individuals under these conditions. Each individual becomes a part of the economic mechanism in order to increase his sum of utilities and to decrease his costs.

* "An Introduction to the Study of Society," by A. W. Small and G. E. Vincent. New York: 1894.

† "The Place of University Extension," *University Extension*, February, 1894.

From no point of view is society more truly "organic" than in its economic aspect. If then the organic concept is serviceable at all in social science it should be so to the economist, whose duty it is to explain the phenomena of co-operation. Economists, however, reject the organic concept of society and prefer to deduce their economic laws from the theory of utility and the facts of the objective world. The individual, even though a unit in a complex mechanism, is still merely an individual having his choices determined by utilitarian motives and by objective conditions. Differences in men, whether mental or physical, are due to the effects of these objective conditions, to which men must adjust themselves in the several local environments. Isolated men or groups have their choices limited by the opportunities of the local environment. The characters and habits of individuals hemmed in by a narrow environment become so differentiated from those of other persons adjusted to other local conditions, that distinct nations or races are formed in each section of the world. Even when large economic aggregates are formed by the massing of people in particular localities the same objective conditions continue the differentiating process. The various types of men attracted to the locality by its favorable conditions find a place for themselves, and additional types of men are evolved through the pressure created by the struggle for existence. During the first stages of a civilization, while choices are determined solely by objective conditions and strictly utilitarian motives, this process of differentiation continues, and the economic aggregate assumes more and more the character of an organism. If an economic aggregate were the highest possible type of a society and a conscious utilitarianism were the only standard for action, there would be some justification for a biologic concept of society. No progress would be possible except through a greater differentiation of individuals and a closer interdependence of the parts. Each individual would lose his mobility and would tend to become a mere cell in a particular part of the social organism.

These economic forces, however, are not the true social forces. The latter counteract the effects of the economic forces and make men equal, mobile and similar in mental and physical characteristics. They take men out from under the domination of local, objective conditions and create a common subjective environment which prevents the differentiation of individuals and the growth of the organic tendency in society. Laws, customs, habits, democratic feelings, ethical ideals and the other phenomena which constitute the subjective environment tend to eradicate those mental and physical peculiarities due to local, objective conditions, and to blend the different races of men into a common type. The forces of the objective environment create

immobility, inequality and subordination among individuals. Those of the subjective environment create mobility, equality and freedom.

The organic concept of society has its origin in an undue emphasis of the economic elements of social progress. The phenomena of a growing economic aggregate are studied while the true social forces which transform economic aggregates into real societies are neglected. Such studies always give a wrong concept of social progress and lead usually to a bad system of economics as well.

No better example of the evil results springing from the use of this method can be found than in the work upon which I am commenting. The whole of the second book is given up to a description of the growth of a Western city from its first settlement until the present time. It is implied that this description illustrates all the various phases of social structure and activity. In reality, however, it gives nothing but a picture of the growth of an economic aggregate. It is the economic and not the social structure that is analyzed. The influence of the division of labor on a growing population and the stratification of society which results from the movement of various types of men into a new region receive due emphasis. If, however, we compare the social ideas of the first settlers* or of the rural group with those of the citizens of the city it will be seen that there has been in this respect a loss rather than a gain. The area of common action and impulse has been lessened and strictly utilitarian motives have displaced the higher ideals which brought the first settlers into the locality and bound them together. The city cannot be aroused to united action so easily as the rural community. Economic motives and organic tendencies have gained prominence at the expense of social progress. Rapid economic integration has caused social disintegration.

A false concept of social growth is given by such a picture and false ideals are inculcated which do immeasurable harm. Under the pretext of describing social growth and structure, a picture of a growing economic aggregate is presented under conditions where the truly social bonds are being weakened by the dominant economic forces. The errors of socialism are mainly due to picturing such economic aggregates as though they were true societies and representing them as exemplifications of the normal tendencies of social progress. Socialists would have us believe that these organic tendencies are the necessary outcome of social progress and that we should give up what little freedom and mobility remain to us in our present economic aggregates and become like a real organism with diverse functions and immobile cells.

The emphasis of organic analogies tends to strengthen such ideals,

*Pp. 101-104.

and to cause us to lose sight of the true social forces. If the development of the region had been through the natural growth of population instead of through immigration, the growth of social forces could have been observed. New customs, laws, rights, duties and ideals would develop to prevent the stratification of society. The differences between individuals would be lessened, and their mobility and freedom would be increased. If these social forces had complete sway the organic cell would disappear, and the individual would be freed from the domination of the local peculiarities of the objective environment.

Professor Small thinks that, in using the term "race knowledge," I unconsciously adopt the organic concept of society. This, however, overlooks the distinction I am trying to make. Race knowledge lies entirely in the individual, and is a social force only because each individual projects it and makes it a part of his environment. A subjective environment is thus created which supplements the objective environment.

A teamster, seeing a stone in the road, turns out for it; shortly after he meets a wagon, and also turns out for it. Is not the motive the same in both cases, and are not also both choices purely personal? In the one case he has a knowledge of stones, in the other a knowledge of certain social regulations, but in both cases the knowledge plus certain utilitarian considerations determines his action. The choice in the one case is as purely individual as in the other.

If we ask why he projects this social regulation, and acts on it as though it were a natural law, we have to consider past conditions and not present realities. Social laws are of slow growth, and due to the psychical changes in individuals. However, to an individual under given conditions, these social laws are as real and objective as are natural laws. Present forces are either in individuals or in the environment, and they alone have any influence on the choices of individuals. Society is the result and not the cause of the action of individuals. Society *is* when its members project the same subjective environment, and thus are led to make the same choices. Its force increases or decreases according as the subjective environment grows or diminishes. It stands between individuals and nature, and measures their power over nature.

The fundamental distinction here is the difference between an organism and its environment. The one implies the other. Every one admits that the individual is an organism, and that there is an objective environment to which it must adjust itself. I think all will agree that the individual and the objective world are not the sole factors in social progress. The habits, customs, rights and duties

which bind individuals into a society imply another element which must be analyzed into a super-organism or into an additional environment. On the one hand, we can conceive of a social will lying back of the individual wills through which the actions of individuals are co-ordinated and combined into a general volition. These social choices plus the choices of individuals blend into one organism, which stands opposed to the objective environment of society. On the other hand, we can conceive of individuals as the sole organisms, and that the objective environment is supplemented by a new environment through the habitual actions of these individuals. Each individual creates his own subjective environment to supplement the objective environment with which he is in contact. Whenever the objective conditions and the pressure of utilitarian motives are the same for a group of individuals, they project the same subjective environment, and thus form a society.

The advantage of the latter concept consists in its simplicity. It does not call for any powers, functions or activities beyond those found in individuals or in the objective world. The subjective environment is merely the outcome of familiar forces in a new form. Even in the objective world the secondary qualities are projected and visualized by the individual. Color, for example, adheres not in the object, but is placed there by the observer. The same faculty is utilized by the individual to objectify his habitual choices. He thinks of them as adhering in the object although created by himself.

The thought of a super-psychology is largely due to the wrong notion of psychology we have inherited from the English empirical philosophers. They held it as a goal of progress, if not as a present reality, that all motives should be strictly utilitarian—a conscious measuring of pleasures and pains. Habits, customs, natural rights and ideals were to them remnants of primitive times and should have no influence on the choices of rational beings. Their psychology overlooked all elements but those of a conscious calculating utilitarianism. They assumed that the individual freed from social tyranny was incapable of other motives and feelings than those which their philosophy recognized. In this way individual psychology came to be used to designate the type of psychology these philosophers had in mind. It might better have been called utilitarian psychology in contrast to race or social psychology. The one type shows the influence of an internal principle—utility—on the development of the psychical instincts, the other shows the influence of external conditions on the same development. All psychology, however, is individual and rests on the same ultimate principles, no matter whether the social or utilitarian elements are dominant.

The biologic sociologists have accepted this utilitarian concept of psychology as being the true psychology of individuals and try to create a super-psychology out of the social elements neglected by the utilitarian philosophers. They confuse the concrete individual of society with notions which these philosophers had of this individual and therefore assume that all psychical elements not recognized by these philosophers belong to a super-organism back of the individual to which all social forces are due. This false step makes a super-psychology a necessity and compels its advocates to use many artificial and forced analogies in order to convince the reader that social phenomena differ radically from those of individual activity.

The errors of the biologic sociologists are due to a wrong concept of the hierarchy of the sciences.* Making sociology follow directly after biology, they overlook the fact that at least three important bodies of knowledge lie back of sociology and separate it from biology, the theory of goods based on objective conditions; the theory of utility, and the theory of social forces. The organic tendencies of society lie mainly in the first of these fields—the conditions of the objective environment. If then the latter two theories are neglected, and the sociologist limits his studies to primitive societies, mere economic aggregates, where the conditions of the objective environment are dominant, he seems to prove the organic nature of society. As soon, however, as the theory of social forces is developed, and the importance of the subjective environment recognized, the defects of the organic concept of society become apparent and a new concept must be created in which, especially for the higher forms of society, the first place must be given to the forces creating the subjective environment.

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PROFESSOR J. B. CLARK'S USE OF THE TERMS "RENT" AND
"PROFITS."

The paper on "Rent and Profit" by Dr. C. W. Macfarlane in the July *ANNALS* is of much interest for the clearness with which the concepts of "marginal" and "differential" rent are distinguished, as well as for the attempt to crystallize the distinction in the suggestive, but hopelessly awkward terms, "price-determining" and "price-determined" surplus.

Dr. Macfarlane's detailed criticisms are less satisfactory—the case against Professor J. B. Clark being signally inadequate. The plausible contradiction found in Professor Clark's saying "of one and the same thing that it is the more useful type of *true rent*, and again, that it is

* See "Failure of Biologic Sociology," *ANNALS*, May, 1894.